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Abstract- We present SEU test and analysis of the Microsemi 
ProASIC3 FPGA. SEU Probability models are incorporated for 
device evaluation. Included is a comparison to the RTAXS 
FPGA illustrating the effectiveness of the overall testing 
methodology. 
Index Terms-FPGA, ProASIC3 versus RTAXS, SEU, Test 
and Analysis 
I. INTRODUCTION 
AN effective method for modeling Single Event Upset (SEU) probabilities (P(ft)uro,) in Field Programmable 
Gate Array (FPGA) devices has been presented[ l ][2]. It is a 
top-down modeling approach. The top-level of the FPGA 
P(ft)mor model was shown to have three major components 
( I): 
• Configuration SEU cross section (P ronfigurar,on) 
• Data path or functional logic SEU cross section 
( P Fuc11onallog1c) 
• Single Event Functional Logic SEU cross section 
(PsEF1) 
. 
P(f s)error OC Pconf!guration + PFunctionalLogic+PsEFI (I) 
The SEU Probability model is used by NASA Goddard 
Radiation Effects and Analysis Group (REAG) as a Single 
Event Effects (SEE) data analysis tool. Upsets that occur 
during radiation testing are differentiated and are categorized 
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in order to enhance device evaluation. The model is a 
reflection of the SEU cross section ( crsEu) for a synchronous 
digital system. Operational frequency ifs) is understood to be 
the inverse of clock period (-rcik) as in (2). 
1 
"elk= Js (2) 
The importance of this subject matter is to present 
Microsemi ProASIC3 FPGA SEU behavior under a variety of 
conditions while illustrating how the REAG SEU model 
facilitates a detailed analysis that spans across FPGA device 
technologies. Microsemi RTAXS data[2] will be used as a 
comparison. 
II. P(FS)EAAoR M ODEL COMPONENTS 
Before radiation testing is perfonned, models of expected 
SEU probabilities based on mitigation and device logic 
structure are constructed: The models are used as reference 
points during radiation testing. During the analysis phase, the 
models are refined to reflect SEU results from radiation 
testing. The following is a more detailed discussion of each 
element in ( 1 ). 
A. FPGA Configuration and P configurarion 
Configuration is a separate technology than the functional 
logic. Accordingly, it has its own categorization of upsets. It 
has been shown through Configuration SEE radiation testing 
of Antifuse[l ]-[4] and Flash technologies[3][4) that Pconfiguurion 
is considered zero as in (3). 
Anti[ use and Flash Con[ i9uration: 
Peon[ i9uration -+ 0: (3) 
The RT AXS has an antifuse configuration [7] while the 
ProASIC3 has a flash configuration [8]. Because Pconfiginrion is 
essentially zero for these devices, the following discussion 
focuses on P(fs)runcrionalLogic and PsEFI· 
B. Functional Logic Data Path Upsets and Pfuncr,onaltog,c 
The functional logic data path is comprised of: 
Combinatorial Logic, Flip-Flops (DFFs), and Routes. Table 1 
illustrates upset types that can potentially occur in a FPGA 
data path. In a synchronous design, every OFF is connected to 
a global clock signal. Because a DFF is master-slave edge 
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flip-flop its internal structure uses both a global clock (CLK) 
and its logical inverse (CLKB). 
TABLE I : COMBINATORIAL LOGIC VERSUS SEQUENTIAL LOGIC 
Tnm 0.-tiu.iliua 
Lcgic f,mctio• cmorrmon 
(comJllllcrion) 
Captut<C ud liol<h eta~ of 
combi.t:.atorw logic 
SET: Glitch i., r}.- combinatorial 
logic: Cap/111'1 is Jrwq~,nq, 
SEU: Nm slate capun cm ~ 
~~d~dmt 
d#~ 
Dottbla-.rid"'1 
J) Synchronous Design Concepts and the Functional 
Data Path 
The essence of synchronous design considers DFFs as 
boundary points. In a design, each boundary point DFF will 
have a cone of logic feeding it. The cone is defined to be a 
backwards trace from an End-Point DFF that stops at its 
previous stage DFFs (Start-Point DFFs). The trace includes 
the Start-Point DFFs and all combinatorial logic within the 
path. One cone of logic is illustrated in Fig. I . 
T,f I T 
EndDFF(t) = f (StarlDFFs(T -1)) 
Cone of Logic 
" 
Fig. I Start-Point DFFs - End Point DFFs t.flr and the Cone of Logic 
2) P(fs)funcr,onalu,g1c Evaluation for Synchronous Designs 
In order to analyze P(fs)fanct1ona1Log,c, each DFF is evaluated 
as an End-Point with a cone of logic backwards trace. 'l'dJy is 
the delay from a Start-Point DFF to an End-Point DFF within 
2 , 
a cone of logic. There is a unique 'l'dty for every Start-Point to 
End-Point. By definition of synchronous design: t d1y < tclk· 
Equation (4) is a breakdown of P(fs)functionalLogic by Start-Point 
DFF and combinatorial logic. 
Term 
TABLE 2: DEFINITION OF TERMS IN EQUATION 4 
Definition 
Probabil ity that the Start-Point DFF will 
incur a SEU and that it will be captured 
by an End-Point 
Probability that the Start-Point DFF will 
incur a SEU and it will be captured' by an 
End-Point 
P(Js) fimc1tona/Log1c CC 
( #$1artPdntDFFs #Combmataa/Cells ) J, ;P(fs)DFFSEV-+SEU(J) + ~P(fs)SET...SEU(,) (4) 
3) Capturing Start-Point DFF Upsets (P(fs)DFFSEu .... sw) 
End Point 
DFF 
???m 
3ns / (A XOR B) AND (C XOR D) 
/_If DFF0 flips its state at .•. 
td1y =9.Sns 
O<t<(tclk-td1y) = 
O<t<(tdk-9.Sns) 
The upset will get caught ... 
otherwise it's as if the event 
never occurred 
Fig. 2: Will the End·Point DFF capture the Start-Point SEU? Capture occurs 
if t<'fdl-tdl,: giving the one-sided signal enough time to reach the End·Point 
OFF 
Term 
l ·tdl/s 
P,,. 
P,,.,, 
TABLE 3 : DEFINmON OF TERMS 
Definition 
Probability the Start-Point DFF will 
incur a SEU 
Portion of clock cycle that the End· 
Point OFF can capture a Start-Point 
DFF SEU before the next clock edge. 
Assumes. the SEU Start-Point DFF is 
always enabled and will have a valid 
value at the next clock edge 
Probability a combinatorial gate will 
incur a SET 
Probability the SET can propagate to 
an End·Point DFF 
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SET width to clock period ratio 
If a Start-Point OFF incurs a SEU (PorFSEu) it will occur at 
time 't as a single sided function (see Table 1) somewhere 
within a clock period ('tcik). It will not manifest as a system 
upset unless an End-Point DFF captures the single sided upset 
at the next clock edge. An End-Point will only capture the 
Start-Point upset if it occurs at 't such that after propagating 
through the delay path ('tdJy), the single sided upset arrives at 
the data pin of the End-Point prior to the clock edge as shown 
in Fig. 3 and (5). 
T<'ictk-'dly (5) 
The portion of the clock period that a Start-Point DFF SEU 
can be captured by an End-Point OFF is shown (6). 
...:...<1- 'dly =1-, ft dly (6) 
'elk 'cffc 
The probability that PomEu will manifest as a system error 
(PDFFSEu- sw) is reflected (7). 
P(fs) DFFSEU -+SEU oc 
(
1/StortPoint DFFs ) 
3 LPDFFSEU(/)(1- ,d/y(j) fs) 
DFF ,~i 
(7) 
4) System Upsets due Combinatorial logic (PsET-SEuJ 
If a SET occurs in a combinatorial logic gate within the 
cone of logic for an End-Point DFF, it has the possibility of 
being captured by its End-Point with a probability of 
(P(fs)sET-sEU). It has been shown [1}[2] that the upper-bound 
P(fs)SET-SEU for a synchronous design is proportional to the 
following probabilities: · generation of a SET (Pgcn), 
propagation of the SET (Pprop), and capture of the SET. In 
addition, the SET capture is proportional to the width ('twidth) 
of the SET with respect to theft as shown in (8). 
(
#Combmotor10/C~ffs ) 
PSET-+SEU OC Di L(Pgm(1)Pp,op(i}'w1dth(1)fs) (8) 
,., 
5) Putting it a/I together DFF and Combinatorial Logic 
Upsets 
As previously mentioned, data path susceptibility 
(P(fs)func:rionalLogic) is based on the cone of logic Start-Point DFF 
capture (P(fs)orrsEu:...sEU) and combinatorial logic gate capture 
(P{fe)sr:r ... sw) as shown in (9). 
3 
. . (9) 
C. Single Event Functional Interrupt (Psm) 
A Single Event Functional Interrupt (SEFI) is a SEU that 
forces the FPGA to be inoperable. According to the NASA 
REAG SEU Model, Psm has two major categories: 
/) Global Route SEFI: Pc1obo/Ro111u 
As previously mentioned, in a ·synchronous design, all DFFs 
must be connected to a clock. In addition, all OFFs should be 
connected to a reset. Clock and reset signals are categorized 
as global routes because they are connected to a large number 
of components . 
An upset in a global route can cause catastrophic events 
because a large number of elements can be affected 
simultaneously. Subsequently, global route networks have 
been categorized as a SEFI. 
2) Hidden Logic SEFI: PH,ddenlog,c 
Some FPGA devices have additional logic that are 
inaccessible to the designer. The hidden logic is used for a 
variety of operations depending on the manufacturer. The 
ProASIC3 and RTAXS contain JTAG circuitry [4][6]. If the 
circuitry were to incur a SEU, it is possible for the FPGA's 
1/0 to become inoperable and hence cause catastrophic 
responses, i.e. a SEFI. However, if the circuitry is grounded 
during operation, it has been proved that no SEFis are possible 
[4][6]. 
3) ProASIC3 and RTAXS PsEFtEquation 
Regarding the ProASIC3 and RTAXS FPGA devices, the 
hidden logic contribution to PsEFl is considered zero. Hence, 
Psm is only affected by the EPGA design's global routes. 
ProAS1C3 and RTAXs: PsEFI oc Pc1obalRoutes (10) 
III. ANALYSIS OF MODEL COMPONENTS 
It is intuitive to expect that a non-mitigated design will have 
a significantly higher crsEu than a mitigated design. It is not 
necessarily intuitive to determine the strength of the mitigation 
or the dominant source of SEUs. However, component 
significance can be determined using Table 4 and crsEU data. 
TABLE 4: ANALYSIS OF SEU CAPTURE EFFECTS: PoFFS!.U-sEu VERSUS P .(ET-~F'L' 
Logic OFF Capture 
Capture percentage of 1-tdl)/s = 
clock period I ·tdJr / ·tclk 
P sET-SEU 
Combinatorial 
SETCaprure 
As frequency 
increases, PoFTsEu-sEu 
increases 
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. . .. 
Frequency 
Dependency 
Combinatorial Logic 
Effect 
Increase in frequency 
decreases PoFFsw-sw 
Increase in 
Combinatorial logic 
increases tcU> and 
decreases PoFFSE.u-scL' 
Increase in frequency 
increases Psrr-Mt' 
Increase in 
Combinatorial logic 
increases Psa-seu 
Based on Table 4, the following is a list of trends used for 
evaluating crsw data and determining dominant sources of 
susceptibility: 
P(/s)oFFsEu-sw Dominance - Most SEUs stem from 
Captured Start-Point DFFs. This is true when: 
• There is an increase in the number of combinatorial 
logic blocks or TdJy and the crsEu (P(fs),,roJ decreases 
in response 
• There is an increase in frequency and the crsw 
decreases in response 
P(/s)srr-sw Dominance - Most SEUs stem from Captured 
Combinatorial Logic SETs. This is true when: 
• There is an increase in frequency and crsru increases 
in response 
• There is an increase in combinatorial logic and crsw 
increases in response 
Local Mitigation Strength: if the design ·has been mitigated 
using a localized-OFF mitigation scheme such as Localized 
Triple Modular Redundancy (LTMR)[ l] or Dual Inter Cell 
(DICE)[6]: 
• It is expected that the DFFs are masked from crsEu 
contribution. P(/s)oFFSEU- sEu should be insignificant 
and hence crsw is lower. ; 
• However, if P(/s)oFFSEu-SEu has the most significant 
error contribution for a localized-OFF mitigation 
scheme, then the mitigation scheme is considered 
weak because it is not fully masking OFF upsets. 
IV. REDUCING SYSTEM ERROR: TRIPLE MODULAR 
REDUNDANCY SCHEMES 
Before testing is performed, general models of expected 
SEU probabilities based on mitigation and device logic 
structure are constructed. The models are used as reference 
points during radiation testing. During the analysis phase, the 
models are refined to reflect SEU results from radiation 
testing. 
For the ProASIC3 and RTAXS, as previously mentioned, 
Peonfiguration is near zero. Substituting P(/s)oFFSEU-SEU and 
P(/s)srr-sw in (I) for P(/s)functionaJLor)c, a non-mitigated 
ProASIC3 or RT AXS design is expected to have a crsw cross 
as reflected in (11 ). 
No - Mitigation qsEu: 
P(fs)Error oc PDFFSEU ... SEU + PsEr ... sEu+PsEFt (II) 
In order to reduce crsEu, mitigation is applied to the 
FPGA design. A common form of mitigation is Triple 
Modular Redundancy (TMR). TMR is a scheme such that a 
4 
group of circuitry is triplicated and then voted. The mitigation 
is a majority voter i.e. best-two-out-of three. lt is important to 
differentiate and signify the TMR scheme based on which 
circuits are redundant so that the user is aware of the strength 
of the mitigation strategy. The following is a discussion of 
two TMR schemes: Localized TMR (LTMR) and Distributed 
TMR (DTMR). 
A. Localized TMR {LTMR) 
Fig 3: Localized Triple Modular Redundancy (LTMR). DFFs are triplicated 
and a voter is inserted into the data path. 
LTMR is the process of triplicating each OFF of a design . 
and inserting a voter after each OFF triplication [1)[7). The 
LTMR process is illustrated in Fig 3. A limitation ofLTMR is 
that shared data paths exist as inputs to the triplicated DFFs. 
Consequently data path SETs are not mitigated and have the 
ability to be captured [1][2][5). 
As a synopsis of the mitigation power of ProASIC3 and 
RT AXS L TMR, DFFs (PorFSEu-sru) are mitigated, but data 
paths (PsEr-sru) are not. If follows that (I I) is reduced to 
( 12) with L TMR insertion. 
( 12) 
B. Distributed TMR{DTMR) 
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DTMR is the process of triplicating the entire design [ l ][7] 
excluding global routes such as clocks, resets, and global 
enables. DTMR is illustrated in Fig 4. No shared data paths 
exist. The points of susceptibility are only attributed to the 
global routes (or manufacturer hidden logic). In this 
manuscript global routes have been grouped into Psrn, 
Accordingly, the DTMR mitigation strategy is expected to 
reduce (1 I) to (13). Due to the dominance of Psm in DTMR 
circuits, DTMR becomes a prime method for evaluating global 
routes during SEE testing. 
DTMR CTsEu: P(f s) Cl( PsEFr (13)' 
V. PROASIC3 AND RTAXS SEE TEST STRUCTURES 
The Device-Under-Test (OUT) test structures followed the 
NASA REAG FPGA testing methodology [2] implementing 
Windowed Shift Registers (WSR) strings and Counter Arrays. 
Only data pertaining to WSR chains are presented. 
4-bit Window Output 
Mt~__.--..L.---'----~-......:;=:;;.L..;;;;;_~...;;;_.;.;;;.. 
Fig. S Windowed Shift Register (WSR) 
A WSR is a shift register with a different output scheme as 
illustrated in Fig. 5. Instead of outputting the last OFF· once 
every clock cycle, a WSR outputs the last 4 DFFs once every 
4 clock cycles. The parallel output has proven successful for 
high speed transmission [ 1 ). 
Windowed Shift Register (WSR) Nomenclature 
• WSRo: N=O Chain ... Only DFFs 
• WSRa: N=S Chain ... 8 Inverters per 1 OFF 
• WSR16: N=l6 Chain ... 16 Inverters per 1 OFF 
Average 'l'dij= 1 ns 
~----.... ~ .. --~~9"~~ .. ~~ omo ~ . 
• M ~ Combinatorial Logic: Inverters I ;.. i, 
Fig. 6: Theoretical representa1ion of one stage of a WSR chain. Actual WSR 
FPGA implementation general has additional combinatorial logic within each 
stage. Average T411lwsRo:: Ins and Average T411lwsRJO :: 7.Sns 
Fig. 6 is a schematic representation of one stage of a WSRo 
and WSR8 shift register. Test structure WSR chains contain 
hundreds of stages per WSR string [5] in order to increase 
event statistics during SEU testing. 
It is important to note that although WSRo represents a 
5 
WSR with only DFFs, in actual FPGA implementations, a 
small portion of additional-unexpected combinatorial logic 
can exist within the shift register stages. The additional logic 
is not shown in Fig. 6. 
Static Timing Analysis (ST A) has been performed on the 
WSR test structures. ST A indicates that the average -rdly for 
WSRo (tc11ylwsRo) :::: Ins and the average 't'd1y for WSRs ('t'dlylwSRS) 
::::7.5ns. 
. The LTMR and DTMR ProASIC3 designs have been 
inserted using the automated synthesis tool: Mentor Precision-
RTL [7]. 
VI. HEAVY ION SEU TESTING 
Heavy-Ion testing has been performed at Texas A&M using 
the NASA REAG Low Cost Digital Testing (LCDT) 
System[4][5]. 
A. SEU Cross Section Calculation 
While the ProASIC3 is exposed to an active heavy-ion 
beam, designs are operating and outputs are compared to 
expected values for each clock cycle. If an output is not 
equivalent to its expected state, then an upset is recorded. 
crsEUs are based on the number of observed upsets normalized 
by the active beam particle fluence. Depending on the 
evaluation, an additional normalization step may be 
implemented to enhance·analysis. 
B. WSR Chains 
. Each WSR chain (e.g. N=O, N=S, and N=l6) has a unique 
SEU cross section (awsRN_sEU) and is normalized by the 
number of DFFs (bits) contained in the string. Equation (14) 
shows <JwsRN sw. 
- # WSR Upsets [cm2] q - ~
WSRN~EU - #Partlcles•#WSR_DFFblts bit (14) 
C. Global Routes 
Because global routes are connected to multiple OFF cells, 
one upset can affect a significant number of DFFs. 
Subsequently, global routes are not normalized by bit. SEU 
cross sections are measured by device. Equation(l 5) shows 
<JsEFL 
# Global Upsets [ cm2 ] 
U sEPI = Uctobal_Route = #Partlt:les ~ (15) 
D. SEU Cross Section Analysis 
After the SEU cross sections are calculated, comparisons 
are performed to their expe~ted models and across designs. 
WSRs are evaluated to determine: 
• P(/sJorrsEu-sEU versus P(/s)sET-sEu dominance: Which 
elements mostly contribute to the overall cr5EU: DFFs or 
combinatorial logic? 
• Frequency dependency: Is there a strong PsET-sEU 
component? If frequency dependence is significant, 
frequency based crsEu data should be used as input to 
error rate calculations. 
• Other SEU Model effects and trends as previously 
described in Section III. 
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VII. HEAVY ION TEST RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. ProAS1C3 Analysis 
One would expect that WSR8 crsEu (crwsRs_sw) will always 
be greater than WS~ crsru (crwsRo_sw) because WSRa chains 
have more logic. However, crsw data reveals that this is not 
always a valid assumption. Fig. 7 illustrates that for 
ProASIC3 No-TMR WSRs, crwsRo_sEU >crwsRs_sEU across all 
LETs. 
ProASIC3 No-TMR and LTMR 100MHz Checkerboard 
1x10.. IWSRllaSNo•TMR 
_ 1x10·7 
.. 
~ 
1 WSR N•O No·TMR 
•WSRNalLTMR 
•WSRN-~LTMR 
} ::::: ~! 
1x10·10 
2. t 
No-TMR: asa,lwS1t1 <asEulwsRo 
LTMR: <JseulwsRS>aSEulwsRo 
Fig. 7: ProASICJ WSRo and WSRJ with No-TMR and user-lnserted LTMR 
For No-TMR WSRo has higher SEU Cross section than WSRJ. With LTMR 
the trend is switched, WSRJ has a higher SEU cross section than WSRo 
Why are No-TMR ProASIC3 crwsRo_sEU >crwsRS_SEU for 
every LET? Consider 'Tdty- With No-TMR, the Offs are not 
mitigated. Hence PomEu-sEu>O and there is a ·'Td1/s 
dependence. It is known that: · 
'Tc11ylwsRo < 'Td1ylwsRs (Fig. 6) and crsEuoc(l -'Td1/s) (as shown in 
(7)), hence it follows that No-TMR: crwsRo sw >crwsRs SEU· 
This can be further observed using the REAG FPGA SEU 
Model and crsw data. Equation ( 16) reflects the crsEu heavy 
ion data in Fig. 7 and the fact that crwsRo sro >crwsRs SEU· 
(P(fs)vFFSEU-+SEU +P(ft)SET-+S£U~~ > -
(P(js)DFFSEU-+SEU + P(fs)s£T-+S£U ~WSR, 
(16) 
There is no combinatorial logic in the WS~ string; hence 
the left side of (16) is reduced and fonns (17). 
(P(fs)vFFS£U-+s£U lws11o > 
(P(fs) vFFSEU-+SEU + P(fs)sET-+SEU )JWSR, 
(17) 
Substitutions are made for P(fs)oFFsw-sw and P(fs)sET-sro 
(17) to fonn (18): 
rd, I 
PDFFSEU (1 - >' IPSR., ) > 
'('elk ( 18) 
Tdlylll-:SR. ~ 
PvmwO . )+ LJP(fs)S£T-+S£U(1> 
'('elk l • I 
Equation (18) reveals the tdly significance with respect to 
the crsEU· In addition, rearrangement ( 18) leads to (19) and 
shows that DFFs are inore SEU susceptible than combinatorial 
6 
logic. 
8 
PDFFSJ::U > I ' elk I LP(Js)SET-+SEU(1) (19) 
i -1' I dly wsn, dly WSR,, ,. 
2.5 
0 2.0 
.::; 
re, 1.5 
a: 
:, 
... 1.0 
t:,"' 0.5 
0.0 
0 
ProASIC3 No-TMR 
Ratio of SEU Cross Sections: 
(O'seu I wsrO)/(O'seu I wsrs) 
~
10 20 30 40 
LET MeVcm2/mg 
Fig. 8: Ratio of ProASIC3 No-TMR WSRi, to WSR, asru across LET 
A more detailed inspection of relative crsw's for the 
ProASIC3 No-TMR WS~ and WSR8 is illustrated in Fig. 8. 
It can be seen that as LET increases, the ratio of WS~ to 
WSR8 slightly decreases. This can be explained using (17) or 
(18). As LET increases, SETs increase in significance. 
Consequently, the P(fs)srr-sEU component becomes more 
significant and subsequently reduces the relative difference 
between crwsRo_sEu and crwsRs_sEU· 
B. ProAS1C3 LTMR-WSRs: Psrr-sEU 
-
.. 
:a 
~ 1x10 .. 
C, 
-
:;;, 
Cal 
r;, 
I:) 
1x10"' 
ProAS1C3 L TMR WSRe Frequency Variation 
•1MHz 
•50MHz 
•100MHz 
8.6 20.3 28.7 
LET(MeV"cm2/mg) 
Fig. 9: ProASICJ LTMR WSRo ,WSR,. and. As the frequency increases or 
the number of combinatorial blocks increases, the asw increases. 
Fig. 7 illustrates that with user-inserted. LTMR, the overall 
crsEU is reduced and now crwsRo sEu <crwsRs sEU· This is as 
expected because P(fs)DFFSEu-sE~ is mitigated with L TMR. 
Consequently, with LTMR insertion, P(fs)srr-sEU is now the 
significant component. In addition the crsru data in Fig. 7 and 
Fig. 9 show the dominance of P(fs)srr-sEu for a LTMR 
design. Given the crsEu data, the dominance of P(fs)sEr-sEU, 
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and the effects of (18), the following hold true for L TMR 
ProASIC3. designs: 
• As the number of combinatorial logic gates increases, 
P(fs)s1:.T-+SEU increases and hence crsEu increases. i.e. 
L TMR crwsRo_sEu <crwsRa_sEU, as illustrated in Fig. 7 
• As frequency increases, OwsRN SEU also increases, as 
illustrated in Fig. 9 -
C. ProASIC3 versus RTAXS Analysis 
I) RTAXS Embedded LTMR versus LTMR-ProAS/C3 
Fig. IO is a comparison between RTA.XS WSRs (contains 
embedded LTMR) with the ProASIC3 WSRs (contains user 
inserted L TMR). It is shown that although the RT AXS has an 
overall lower crsEU, the LTMR'd ProASIC3 OsEU are not 
drastically higher. In addition, the data shows that the LET 
threshold (LETrn) for the LTMR'd ProASIC3 is statistically 
similar to the RTA.XS. · 
RTAXs versus ProAS1C3 100MHz 
Checkerboard Pattern WSR Strings 
1x10·1 
-
-:C 1x10 .. N" 
E 
u 
~ 
~ 1x10 .. 
r: RTAXsN=O 
•RTAXsN=8 
• LTMR ProASIC3 N=O 
•LTMRProASIC3 N=8 
8.60 28.71 
LET MeV*cm2/mg 
Fig. 10: RTAXS with embedded LTMR versus ProAS1C3 with user inserted 
LTMR. WSR Tesi°Structures 
ProASIC3 OwsRN SEU are higher than RTA.XS OwsRN SEU 
for two major reasons:- -
1. The ProASIC3 is a commercial grade part 
containing gates with switching rates considerably 
higher than the RTAXS[4][6]. In addition, the 
routing network of the ProASIC3 has less 
capacitive loading than the RTA.XS as fan-out and 
length increases. :By definition, faster switching 
rates and less capacitance lead to a higher SET 
Pprop than slower circuits that contain significant 
capacitive loading. 
2. The RT A.XS embedded mitigation scheme uses a 
wired-or as a voter[3)[4]. The wired-or does not 
contribute to the <rsEu because it does not use 
transistors to perform the voting. However, the 
ProASIC3 voters utilize a number of transistors to 
perform the "best-two-out-of-three function and 
hence have a significant contribution to the overall 
OsEU. Fig. 6 illustrates the difference between 
RTA.XS and ProASIC3 mitigation schemes. 
·" · '4-/~/ ·(t' 
ProAS1C3 user-inserted 
LTMRwith Voter 
RTAXs Embedded LTMR OFF with combinatorial logic 
Wired-or 
7 
Fig. 11: RTAXS e~bedded LTMR(4] versus ProAS1C3 user-inserted L TMR 
2) UsEU reduction with an increase in combinatorial 
logic: ProASIC3 versus RT AXS 
. As previously mentioned, one would expect that <rwsRo_SEU 
<crwsRa_sEU because WSR.a chains have more logic (i.e. WSR.a 
contains more combinatorial logic between OFF stages than 
WSRo). However, we have shown that this is not always the 
case. In support, Fig. 7 illustrates that across all LET values 
the No-TMR-ProASIC3 crwsRo_sEU ><rwsRs_SEU· This No-TMR 
trend is due to dominant P(ft)omEu-sEU and t drr By inserting 
L TMR, the data shows that the trend reverses. For L TMR-
ProASIC3 OwsRo SEU <crwsRs SEU for all LET values due to the 
mitigation of P(ft)oFFSEU-+SEU ~ 
Regarding the SEU response to increasing combinatorial 
logic in the RTA.XS, it has also been observed that an increase 
in combinatorial logic at LET <10MeV*cm2/mg_ can reduce 
,osEu due to attenuation of SETs [2). Although the RTAXS 
and the No-TMR ProASIC3 both have trends where crwsRo_sEu 
>crwsRs_sEu, the conditions and rationales for the unexpected 
SEU response are completely different. 
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TABLES: COMPARISON OF PROOFS EXPLAINING WHY WSRa 0SEU < WS~ OsEU 
PROASIC3 VERSUS RTAXS 
No-TMR ProASICJ RTAXS embedded 
LTMR 
Significant 
component 
Significant circuit OFF (sequential): SEU 
type 
Error Strength One sided function is 
generally strong (assuming 
SEU is not a metastable 
event). Has the strength to 
propagate 10 the End-Point 
OFF 
Variables t411 •ft or t c,lt,11: 
responsible for 
WSRa ssiu < WSRo 
sssv 
Combinatorial: SET 
Two-sided function. 
Low LETs produces 
small SETs. Higher 
LETs produce larger 
SETs with more energy 
to propagate to End-
Point DFF 
LET values when 
valid 
Across all LETs Non-Linear across LET 
because tdir is constant and because P P""P is weaker 
P=u remains significant at low LETs 
Table 5 provides the variation in factors that influ~nce the 
<>wsRo_sEu >crwsRa_sEU response for No-TMR ProASIC3 and 
RTAXS WSRs. 
D. DTMR ProAS1C3 Results and PsEFI 
Equation (13) shows that OTMR mitigates all of 
P(fs)j,,nc11ona/u,g1c forcing PsEFI to be the dominant <>sru, 
Subsequently, OTMR FPGA designs facilitate test and 
. analysis of PsEFJ· 
Global Upsets with DTMR 
6.0x10-s 
-
5.0x10-s 
.~ 
4.0x10-s u 
'> 
1DTMR1MHt 
IDTMRSOMHz 
~ 3.0x10·5 ,, 
~ 2.ox10·5 
E 
u 1.ox10·5 
-:, 
Ill 0 Ill 
l, 53.10 75.09 
LET MeVcm2/mg 
Fig. 12: OTMR WSR Global Roule SEU Cross Sections operating at 50MHz 
and !MHz with checkerboard data pattern. Cross Sections arc per device. No 
Global SEUs were observed below LET= 20.3McVcm2/mg at SOMHz 
It is noted that no global route upsets were observed below 
53.1MeV•cm2/mg for WSR strings. However, for more 
complex test structures, global route upsets were observed at 
· 20.3 MeV•cm2/mg and above [5]. More testing is expected to 
be completed to increase statistics and enhance ProASIC3 
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global route analysis. 
Global routes are ,expected not to have a frequency 
dependence because they are not captured SEUs. However, 
they can cause a SEU to be captured. As an example, a SET 
that occurs on a global route (e.g. a clock) can cause a OFF to 
capture the state of its data pin at an erroneous point in time 
regardless of clock frequency. The <>sEu data reflects this 
assumption and does not show frequency dependence. 
As previously mentioned, global routes are designed to 
connect to a large numb~r (tens of thousands) of OFF clock or 
reset pins. Generally their routing structures are accomplished 
as a tree of buffers [1][4)(6). The buffers are required to have 
switching rates (rise-fall times) in the picoseconds range while 
driving a considerable capacitive load. The <>sru data in Fig. 
12 shows a relatively high LETrn for global routes. This 
suggests that ProASIC3 global networks have an inherent 
hardness due to their high-drive capability and capacitive 
damping throughout their routes. 
vm. CONCLUSION 
The NASA REAG FPGA SEU testing methodology has 
been applied to Actel RT AXS and ProASIC3 FPGA devices. 
Because the ProASIC3 is a commercial grade device, 
mitigation strategies have been inserted into the OUT designs. 
Each design with and without mitigation has been evaluated to 
determine the effectiveness of the various mitigation 
strategies. 
During the development and test phases, high level REAG 
FPGA SEU models assisted with OUT design creation and 
were used as points of reference during testing. Post-
irradiation, SEU test results were analyzed and applied to the 
expected SEU probability models to develop more precise 
models. The refined FPGA SEU models have proven to 
reliably refle.ct the <>sw data, mitigation strategy, and 
synchronous design component effects (DFFs and 
combinatorial logic). 
Regarding heavy-ion data, ProASIC3 LTMR has proven to 
improve SEU performance with ·respect to No-TMR 
ProASIC3 designs by increasing the LET TH to near 
8.6MeV•cm2/mg and reducing the overall <>sru-
When comparing the LTMR ProASIC3 to the RTAXs SEU 
data, it has been shown that the ProASIC3 L TMR LET 
Threshold (LETrn) is compa{t'ble with the RTAXS LETrn, 
However, the overall ProAS1C3 L TMR cross sections are 
higher than the RT AXS cross sections. In addition, <>sEu 
reduction was observed as the number of combinatorial logic 
blocks were increased for both devices. However, it has been 
shown that the cause for the <>sru reduction in both devices 
and when it occurs are due to completely different conditions. 
Using the REAG FPGA model illustrated why OTMR 
isolates Psm and subsequently is an effective method for test 
and evaluation of PsEFI· Heavy ion data show that ProASIC3 
OTMR has improved the SEU response by increasing LET TH 
to near 20Mev•cm2/mg. 
The testing methodology developed by NASA REAG 
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includes test preparation, test execution, and data analysis. 
The approach has proven to be a successful, technology-
independent means to facilitate device evaluation and , 
comparison studies. 
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